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THE PRICE OF JUSTICE:
DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS IN
THE CONTEXT OF IRANIAN SANCTIONS
KRISTIE XIAN*
“The sense of public justice in the community at large is offended and every
rogue, on the contrary, is encouraged, if punishment
be not adequate and certain.”1
INTRODUCTION
Peter Sands was sweating.  It was August 2012, and the multi-billion
dollar London-based conglomerate Standard Chartered Bank had just
been accused of violating Iranian sanctions under Sands’s watch as
CEO.  Sands was accused of trashing his company’s sterling reputation
by engaging in shady transactions with Iran, which has been under U.S.
economic sanctions since 1979.2  Not only was Standard Chartered
accused of using its New York branch to facilitate numerous interna-
tional transactions between itself and the Iranian government, its exec-
utives were also accused of participating in a broad cover-up scheme
and lying to investigators about making the transactions.3  The charges
alleged that Standard Chartered hid 60,000 secret transactions in Ira-
nian funds worth a staggering $250 billion.4  The bank’s initial reaction
to these charges was not as elegant as shareholders might have hoped:
finance director Richard Meddings, who was accused of showing “obvi-
ous contempt for US banking relations,” blasted back, “You f———
Americans. Who are you to tell us, the rest of the world, that we’re not
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, Class of 2014; Bachelor of
Arts, Georgetown University, Class of 2011.  I wish to thank Professor Jimmy Gurulé for
bringing this subject to my attention and for providing invaluable suggestions and advice
during the writing process.  I also thank my parents, George and Cindy, and my friends
for their constant love and support.  Finally, I thank the 2013–2014 editorial staff of the
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy for providing helpful suggestions, insights,
and corrections throughout the editing process.
1. Simeon E. Baldwin, The Fundamental Principles of Criminal Justice, 22 YALE L.J. 30,
35 (1912).  Baldwin was a jurist, law professor, and served as the sixty-fifth Governor of
Connecticut.
2. Iran Sanctions, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/
index.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2014).
3. Yuki Noguchi, Why Evading U.S. Rules May Tempt Foreign Banks (National Public
Radio broadcast Aug. 10, 2012), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/
transcript.php?storyId=158507406.
4. Dan Fitzpatrick & Robin Sidel, New J.P. Morgan Jam, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2012, at
C1.  At the time the transactions occurred, Iranian financial institutions were subject to
U.S. economic sanctions.  Later, the list of sanctioned countries involved in the allega-
tions expanded to include Libya, Myanmar, and Sudan. See Too Big to Jail: Two Big British
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going to deal with Iranians.”5  Subsequently, Standard Chartered’s
stock plummeted sixteen percent in London trading.6  The most alarm-
ing revelation was that Standard Chartered might lose its New York
license, which analysts predicted would lead to a devastating forty per-
cent drop in earnings.7
But Sands had many on his side.  U.K. officials supported Standard
Chartered’s denials, and the charges even prompted the Mayor of
London, Boris Johnson, to seethe, “[Y]ou can’t help thinking [these
charges] might actually be at least partly motivated by jealousy of
London’s financial sector—a simple desire to knock a rival centre.”8
Bank of England Governor Mervyn King criticized Benjamin Lawsky, a
New York Department of Financial Services regulator and leader in
charges against Standard Chartered, for failing to coordinate with his
counterparts.9  In actuality, those counterparts were quietly gathering
their legal weaponry for a standoff against Lawsky himself, rather than
Standard Chartered.  The Federal Reserve, the U.S. Treasury Depart-
ment, the Justice Department, and the Manhattan District Attorney’s
Office all understood that they would “have to work this [scandal] out
at [the] international level”10 and complained in published reports that
the original order was a “publicity stunt that disrupted their own probes
of the matter.”11
The subsequent trajectory of events unraveled in a way that sur-
prised even U.S. regulators’ most vocal supporters.  Standard Chartered
Bank settled charges with both New York State and the U.S. govern-
ment regarding its illegal transactions with Iran.12  Astonishingly, the
5. Lawsky’s ‘Go it Alone’ Attack on Standard Chartered Angers US Regulators, DAILY TELE-
GRAPH (UK) (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/bank-
sandfinance/9460830/Lawskys-go-it-alone-attack-on-Standard-Chartered-angers-US-
regulators.html.
6. Gavin Finch & Howard Mustoe, Standard Chartered CEO Says “No Grounds” to
Revoke License, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-
08-08/standard-chartered-ceo-sands-rejects-n-y-regulator-s-claims-1-.html.
7. Greg Farrell & Tiffany Kary, Standard Chartered Still Faces Fed Probes After N.Y. Deal,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-14/stan-
dard-chartered-faces-fed-probes-after-n-y-deal.html.
8. Mayor Johnson also haughtily contended that the charges were politically moti-
vated, writing in the same opinion piece for London-based Spectator magazine, “[Y]ou
can’t help wondering whether all this beating up of British banks and bankers is starting
to shade into protectionism.” See Boris Johnson, Diary, SPECTATOR (UK) (Aug. 11, 2012),
http://www.spectator.co.uk/the-week/diary/123450/diary-503/. For discussion of how
heads of corporations and their attitudes can affect a company’s propensity to engage in
white collar crime, see generally Cynthia A. Koller, Laura A. Patterson & Elizabeth B.
Scalf, When Moral Reasoning and Ethics Training Fail: Reducing White Collar Crime Through the
Control of Opportunities for Deviance, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 549, 570
(2014).
9. Finch & Mustoe, supra note 6.
10. Id.
11. Farrell & Kary, supra note 7.
12. Jim Zarroli, British Bank Settles Money Laundering Charges (National Public Radio
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bank only ended up paying a fine of $240 million.13  Later, Standard
Chartered paid an additional $327 million.14  Its fees totaled $667 mil-
lion—only 2.5% of the transactions involving Iranian funds.15  Moreo-
ver, Standard Chartered was not banned from trading in the United
States.  In fact, no individual bank official has been criminally charged
for wrongdoing to date.16  Instead, U.S. regulators chose the lenient
path of deferred prosecution agreements to incentivize the bank to
abide by the sanctions.17
Standard Chartered was not the first international financial institu-
tion to be accused or charged of money laundering and engaging in
illegal transactions.  Since 2009, Credit Suisse,18 Royal Bank of Scot-
land,19 Lloyds TSB Group,20 Barclays, ING Bank,21 ABN Amro,22 and
HSBC23 have all agreed to pay enormous settlements to the U.S. gov-
ernment for facilitating illicit financial transfers on behalf of countries
ranging from Iran to Cuba, all of which are subject to U.S. economic
13. Id.  The amount that Standard Chartered profited from other illegal transac-
tions, including those with Libya, Myanmar, and Sudan, remains unreported.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Farrell & Kary, supra note 7.
17. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Dec. 10 2012), http://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/20121210a.htm [hereinafter
Standard Chartered Press Release].
18. Claudio Gatti & John Eligon, Iranian Dealings Lead to a Fine for Credit Suisse, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2009, at B1 (reporting that Credit Suisse violated sanctions by assisting
Iran funnel hundreds of millions of dollars through American banks and engaging in
smaller transactions with Syria, Sudan, Burma, and Libya, but Credit Suisse only paid a
civil fine of $536 million).
19. Samuel Rubenfeld, RBS, DOJ to End Deferred-Prosecution Agreement Over ABN Amro,
WALL ST. J. CORRUPTION CURRENTS BLOG (Dec. 28, 2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/corrup-
tion-currents/2011/12/28/rbs-doj-to-end-deferred-prosecution-agreement-over-abn-
amro/ (noting that Royal Bank of Scotland agreed to forfeit $500 million and admit that
ABN Amro, one of its acquired banks, assisted Iran, Cuba, Libya, and Sudan to move
more than $3.2 billion in high-risk transactions that flowed through its New York branch).
20. Lloyds Group hid the source of billions of dollars that passed through its
United States branch offices, handling at least $300 million of Iranian transfers and $20
million of Sudanese transfers which might have been used to finance Iran’s nuclear pro-
gram and buy a large amount of tungsten, an ingredient in producing long-range mis-
siles. See Vikas Bajaj & John Eligon, Iran Moved Billions via U.S. Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10,
2009, at B1.
21. ING transferred $1.6 billion to Iran, Sudan, Cuba, and other sanctioned coun-
tries, but only received a $536 million fine, or thirty-three percent of the total transac-
tions. See Karen Freifeld, ING to Pay $619 Million of Cuba, Iran Sanctions, REUTERS (Jun. 12,
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/12/us-ing-sanctions-idUSBRE85B12I
20120612.
22. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former ABN Amro Bank N.V. Agrees to
Forfeit $500 (May 10, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/May/10-crm-548.html
(ABN AMRO, now the Royal Bank of Scotland, was charged with defrauding the United
States by facilitating the movement of illegal money by stripping information from trans-
actions, thereby violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act).
23. Andrew Keshner, HSBC Agrees to $1.9B Penalty in Money-Laundering Probe, N.Y. L.
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sanctions.24  Most recently, as part of its settlement with the Depart-
ment of Justice, HSBC agreed to pay $1.9 billion and improve its com-
pliance measures.25  However, these banks have not been under the
typical scrutiny that would accompany corporate transgressions—
namely, arrest and prosecution.26  Instead, deferred prosecution agree-
ments typically allow a bank to avoid a criminal conviction as long as
the bank promises to follow the terms of the agreements.27  As a result,
the bank will not be under the scrutiny of the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation, which has the power to revoke a bank’s insurance
for “engaging in unsafe or unsound practices in conducting the busi-
ness of depository institution.”28  The crux of deferred prosecution
hinges on the corporation’s willingness to “cooperate” with the govern-
ment investigation in order to receive the privilege of avoiding criminal
prosecution.
On the surface, deferred prosecution agreements guard against
the harmful consequences of criminally charging a defendant while
properly punishing those who have willfully engaged in illegal activities.
Those who are in the wrong are able to avoid the reputation of criminal
liability and serious collateral consequences of such a conviction.29
Proponents allege that the terms of deferred prosecution agreements
encourage future compliance while providing an avenue for restitution
through enormous monetary fines.  Likewise, banks are incentivized to
abide by the sanctions.30  Agreements typically include an admission of
violations accompanied by a significant monetary penalty and a promise
of future compliance.31  The prolonged use of deferred prosecution
raises questions of whether banks have sufficient incentive to comply
with laws if they are not being criminally charged.
But by avoiding alleged severe collateral consequences of indict-
ment and conviction, corporations are more likely to engage in illegal
transactions, knowing that their punishment will be reduced to a mone-
tary penalty that is worth a fraction of potential profits.  For example,
Standard Chartered’s Iranian transactions totaled an astounding figure
of $250 billion, yet it was fined just 2.5% of that sum.32  Despite its
24. ECONOMIST, supra note 4.
25. Peter J. Henning, In Bank Settlements, Fines but No Accountability, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Dec. 12, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/in-bank-settle-
ments-big-fines-but-no-accountability.
26. Id.
27. See Lawrence D. Finder, Ryan D. McConnell & Scott L. Mitchell, Betting the Cor-
poration: Compliance or Defiance?, 27 CORP. COUNSEL REV. 2 (2009).
28. Henning, supra note 25.
29. See Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judi-
cial Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1867
(2005).
30. Standard Chartered Press Release, supra note 17.
31. Henning, supra note 25.
32. Zarroli, supra note 12. Cf. Erika Eichelberger, Elizabeth Warren Slams Federal Reg-
ulators Over Bank Money Laundering, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 7, 2013, 5:45 P.M.), http://www
.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/03/elizabeth-warren-senate-banking-committee-hearing-
money-laundering (International bank HSBC was fined $1.9 billion for laundering $881
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transgression, neither the bank nor any individual banker has been
criminally held responsible.33  Are the consequences of criminally
charging bank executives as severe as proponents might suggest, culmi-
nating in massive lay-offs or decreased share value?34  Should prosecu-
tors be given virtually unfettered power in deciding how proactive they
must be in charging corporations, what conditions a corporation must
satisfy in order to avoid being charged, and which corporations deserve,
ex ante, the compliance measures?
Deferred prosecution agreements promote the epidemic of banks
knowingly and consistently violating economic sanctions, creating an
anathema to our fundamental system of justice.  Deference to these
agreements breeds disrespect for an impartial judicial system and gen-
erates a dual system of justice that favors large financial institutions.35
While individual criminals are sent to jail for selling small amounts of
prohibited drugs to sanctioned countries, banks and their managers are
paying a mere fine for laundering billions of dollars to drug cartels.36
Further, applying these agreements in the corporate context
encourages corporations and their supervisors to flout international
sanctions without fear of reparation or further punishment.  Individuals
then sacrifice American national security interests for pure profit.
Deferred prosecution agreements’ ramifications, such as abandoning
fairness in favor of procedural ease, eschewing principles of law, and
endorsing a double standard of justice by treating corporations and
individuals differently, outweigh the small possibility of corporate disin-
tegration.  Finally, the biggest danger in relying on deferred prosecu-
tions is the agreements’ susceptibility to morphing into arbitrary
enforcement.  Prosecutors have wide discretion in using these agree-
ments, even after years of undetected wrongdoing.  Then, not only will
corporations lack the incentive to obey economic sanctions because the
risk of criminal prosecution is small for institutions that are “too big to
33. Tiffany Kary & Greg Farrell, HSBC in Settlement Talks With U.S. Over Money Laun-
dering, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-
24/hsbc-in-settlement-talks-with-u-s-over-money-laundering.html.
34. After the New York State Department of Financial Services issued an official
order alleging that Standard Chartered conspired with the Government of Iran, its shares
fell twenty-four percent. See generally Bruce Zagaris, New York Bank Regulator Accuses British
Bank of Violating Iranian Sanctions for Almost Ten Years and Bank Settles, 28 INT’L ENFORCE-
MENT L. REP. 383 (Oct. 2012).
35. One criminal defense attorney recognized that there is a “double standard” for
corporations and individuals under deferred prosecution agreements, but the standard
ought to exist to protect the corporation, a “legal fiction” that cannot “go to jail.” See
Crime Without Conviction: The Rise of Deferred Prosecution and Non Prosecution Agreements,
Corp. Crime Rep. (Russell Mokhiber ed., Dec. 28, 2005), available at http://corporate
crimereporter.com/deferredreport.htm.
36. Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) recently questioned HSBC’s deferred prose-
cutions during a Senate Banking Committee hearing.  She noted:
If you’re caught with an ounce of cocaine, the chances are good you’re going to
jail . . . . But evidently, if you launder nearly a billion dollars for drug cartels and
violate our international sanctions, your company pays a fine and you go home
and sleep in your own bed at night—every single individual associated with
this—and I just think that’s fundamentally wrong.
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fail,” but the banks’ quick dismissal also places the United States at a
huge security risk.37  Such a designation renders the banks’ activities
less dangerous than they actually are; despite repeated successes in ena-
bling drug running and terrorist financing, banks, whether individually
or on the corporate level, will have little incentive to stop their profita-
ble and illegal activities.
This Note contends that Iranian sanctions are undermined by the
continued use of deferred prosecution agreements.  Deferred prosecu-
tions should be limited as a prosecutorial tool to the traditional realm
of juvenile and drug offenders.  Part I discusses the recent history and
legal standard for Iranian sanctions, specifically observing the breadth
of recent legislation aimed to stem financial transactions with Iran.
Part II addresses the problems with deferred prosecution agreements,
comparing the traditional use of deferred prosecution to its increased
applicability to corporate crime.  Then, Part III looks at the judicial
oversight of deferred prosecution agreements as a means of deterring
money laundering, contrasting the traditional use in criminal cases with
the Department of Justice’s current approach towards corporate enti-
ties.  Part IV underscores the litany of consequences of overuse of
deferred prosecution agreements, from violating principles of justice to
encouraging prosecutorial overreach.  Part V concludes with policy rec-
ommendations, including deferred prosecution substitutes and better
mechanisms for enforcement.
I. LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR IRANIAN SANCTIONS
Economic sanctions against Iran were passed with the intention of
pressuring and punishing a regime whose actions tremendously con-
flicted with U.S. interest.  The historical events that preceded the sanc-
tions unfolded in a dramatic and consequential manner.  Created as a
way to give the President additional regulatory powers to address
national security threats, Congress passed the International Emergency
Economics Powers Act (IEEPA) in 1977.  IEEPA authorizes the Presi-
dent to declare the existence of “any unusual and extraordinary
threat . . . to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the
United States” that originates “in whole or substantial part outside the
United States.”38  In particular, the President may block transactions
and freeze the assets of the threatening state.39  IEEPA became the
legal foundation upon which the President enacted laws to deal effec-
tively with international threats.
37. For example, in the context of Iranian sanctions, many of the funds that are
laundered could be used to support rogue states’ nuclear weapon development. See Jes-
sica Silver-Greenberg, Standard Chartered Agrees to Settle Iran Money Transfer Claims, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 10, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/standard-
chartered-agrees-to-settle-iran-money-transfer-claims/; Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Green-
berg, HSBC to Pay $1.92 Billion to Settle Charges of Money Laundering, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10,
2012, at A1.
38. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (2012).
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IEEPA’s passage allowed the United States to respond affirmatively
and quickly to subsequent volatile events.  In 1979, fifty-two Americans
were taken hostage in Iran.40  The situation quickly escalated into an
international crisis, leading President Carter to freeze Iranian govern-
ment assets in the United States.41  In 1984, the United States desig-
nated Iran as a supporter of international terrorism.  Subsequently,
agencies implemented numerous sanctions against Iran.42  The eco-
nomic impact on Iran was significant: As a result of the sanction, the
United States controlled $12 billion of Iranian assets, the biggest block-
ing of assets in U.S. history.
IEEPA is perhaps the most effective and influential piece of legisla-
tion on the multilateral containment of Iran and is one that utilizes
economic sanctions in response to a variety of national security con-
cerns.  Under IEEPA, the President has the authority to issue executive
orders to block certain business transactions or freeze assets in response
to any threats to national security, foreign policy, or the economy.43
Executive orders that range from barring U.S. investment in Iran’s
energy sector44 to freezing assets of and barring U.S. transactions with
entities that support international terrorism45 have been brought
under this Act.
In terms of remedies, IEEPA provides for civil liability for violations
of U.S. sanctions law on a strict liability basis.46  Penalties that are
accorded with noncompliance of sanctions laws include fines and, in
the case of willful noncompliance, imprisonment.47  The Office of For-
eign Assets Control (OFAC) of the U.S. Department of Treasury
administers and enforces these sanctions pursuant to U.S. foreign pol-
icy and national security goals, focusing on those parties that willingly
engage in transactions with or on behalf of sanctioned parties.48  This
office also has the power to designate an individual or organization as a
Specially Designated Terrorist (SDT), allowing it to freeze their assets
and subjecting them to potential criminal or civil liability.  IEEPA’s
40. Robert Carswell, Economic Sanctions and the Iran Experience, 60 FOREIGN AFF., 229,
247 (1981).  Iran released the hostages fourteen months later.
41. Id. at 249.
42. U.S. GOV’T ACCTOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IRAN SANCTIONS: IMPACT GOOD OR BAD?
viii (2008).  First, the Treasury oversaw a ban on U.S. trade and investment.  Second,
foreign parties were sanctioned against engaging in proliferation and terrorism-related
activities with Iran.  Finally, the Treasury and State Departments were given power to use
sanctions to freeze targeted parties’ access, and reduce their assets, to the U.S. financial
system.
43. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2012).
44. Exec. Order No. 13059, 62 Fed. Reg. 44,531 (Aug. 19, 1997).
45. Exec. Order No. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).  For a general
discussion of how the UN Security Council devised and implemented a global economic
sanctions regime to freeze economic resources of individuals and entities who support
acts of terrorism, see Jimmy Gurulé, The Demise of the U.N. Economic Sanctions Regime to
Deprive Terrorists of Funding, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 19 (2009).
46. Alex Lakatos & Jan Blöochliger, The Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Anti-Terrorism
Laws, 14 ELEC. BANKING L. & COM. REP. 1, 5 (2010).
47. 50 U.S.C. § 1705 (2007).
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range of powers has allowed the government to impede specifically the
wide range of options that fund international terrorism.
IEEPA’s effectiveness would not exist without its broad jurisdic-
tional reach.  Two provisions support its jurisdiction.49  First, all U.S.
citizens and residents must comply with U.S. sanctions laws.  Expatriate
employees, visiting staff members, and contractors performing services
in non-U.S. offices are all considered “residents.”50  Second, parties that
“cause a violation” of any regulation or prohibited act issued under
IEEPA are subject to the same penalties and violations as those who
“violate, attempt to violate” or “conspire to violate.”51  Most impor-
tantly, non-U.S. institutions must provide particular care to not contra-
vene IEEPA regulations.  Any party not directly covered by OFAC
regulations that causes a party covered by OFAC regulations to violate
such regulations, whether willingly or unwittingly, is subject to IEEPA
penalties.  Thus, given the complexities of foreign financial institutions,
foreign banks that cause their U.S.-based branch to violate OFAC
prohibitions are subject to punishment.  Criminal penalties include
imprisonment for up to twenty years.52
Further, IEEPA is successful at promulgating the goals of U.S. sanc-
tions programs.  Mainly, the United States seeks to mitigate supporting
international terrorists, and OFAC requires branches of foreign banks
to block and report “all property within their possession or control” in
which sanctioned nations, individuals, and entities have an interest.53
Extraterritorial overreach includes “interests” such as foreign assets
held by U.S. citizens.  In one case, the First Circuit barred an engineer-
ing firm’s attempt to recover payment for services rendered in connec-
tion with Iranian electricity projects.54  There, the court cited IEEPA’s
“sweeping and unqualified” language to encompass all “interests” that
U.S. citizens may have in Iranian assets.55  Moreover, parties are not
excluded from IEEPA just because their co-conspirators do not fall
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.  If at least some
physical component of their property, whether it is computer equip-
ment or actual cash, is stored in the United States, a defendant may still
be liable for conspiring to defraud the United States.56  As long as the
Secretary of State affords proper notice that an individual or entity will
49. 50 U.S.C. § 1705(a) (2012).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 31 C.F.R. § 543.701(a)(2) (2011).
53. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
54. Chas. T. Main Int’l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800, 808
(1st Cir. 1981).
55. Id. at 807.
56. See, e.g., United States v. McKeeve, 131 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1997). This approach
is consistent with IEEPA’s procedural framework, which expressly confers on the Presi-
dent the power to prohibit commercial transactions with certain foreign nations “with
respect to any property . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”  See also 50





      05/20/2014   11:05:20
35013-nde_28-2 Sheet No. 108 Side A      05/20/2014   11:05:20
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-2\NDE208.txt unknown Seq: 9 14-MAY-14 13:25
2014] THE PRICE OF JUSTICE 639
be designated as a foreign terrorist organization, due process require-
ments are satisfied.57
Additional uses of executive authority under IEEPA have gone sim-
ilarly unquestioned and declared a constitutional delegation of legisla-
tive authority to the Executive.  According to this argument, IEEPA is
consistent with Congress’s intent to confer broad and flexible power
upon the President to impose and enforce economic sanctions against
nations that the President categorizes as a threat to national security
interests.58  Also, because IEEPA has enumerated standards for the
President to follow if she wants to proscribe conduct, IEEPA is a consti-
tutional grant of authority by Congress to the President to marshal,
transfer, and freeze Iranian assets.59  The statute “meaningfully con-
strains” Presidential discretion, for the President must find an “unusual
and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, or
economy of the United States” originating on foreign soil had reached
“national emergency” proportions before invoking IEEPA.60  As such,
when a defendant who enters into agreements with a country from
which “unusual and extraordinary” threats have emanated,61 he can
expect to be prosecuted and subsequently imprisoned for engaging in
transactions “concerning property in which an enemy has an economic
interest.”62  Courts have further held that the engineer’s wish to be
compensated for his assets was “ab initio subordinate to the President’s
IEEPA powers.”63  As such, the President may take measures that he
deems appropriate to halt further support of countries whose interests
and actions may be contrary to safety of the country.
Over time, the rationale behind the sanctions evolved from disci-
plining Iran for its role in the hostage crisis to acting as both a symbolic
and practical defiance to Iran’s government policies.  The country’s
opposition to the U.S. role in Middle East negotiations, support for
Hezbollah and Hamas, acquisition of nuclear and ballistic weapons,
encouragement of international terrorism, and general hostility
towards the United States gave additional reasons for promoting and
legislating the sanctions.64  Undoubtedly, though many thought that
57. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 164 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (discussing also that notice of such designation does not require the Treasury
Department to disclose classified information to be presented in camera and ex parte to the
court).
58. United States v. Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d 1087, 1093–94 (4th Cir. 1993).
59. Unidyne Corp. v. Gov’t of Iran, 512 F.Supp. 705, 709 (E.D. Va. 1981).
60. United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 572 (3d Cir. 2011). See also Islamic
American Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F.Supp.2d 34 (D.D.C. 2005)
(noting that after the President made a finding of a state of national emergency to invoke
any IEEPA provision, any challenge based on IEEPA must be to the determination that an
“unusual and extraordinary threat” exists).
61. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d at 580 n.25. Congress has also not considered the termina-
tion of the “national emergency” status with respect to Iran.
62. Id. at 584.
63. Chas. T. Main Int’l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800, 808
(1st Cir. 1981).
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the sanctions had great “effectiveness,” there has not been a significant
change in the regime as to quell completely Iran’s use of state funds to
support activities opposed by the United States; nor have the sanctions
highly impacted Iran’s economy.65  However, the sanctions were
accompanied by restrictions on financing, reducing U.S.-Iranian trade
in goods and services.66  As such, the sanctions have hindered Iran’s
ability to fund its acquisition of prohibited items and terrorism-related
activities.67  Most importantly, the sanctions hinder Iran’s ability to con-
tract with U.S. institutions, eliminating its access to the financial system
in order to support proliferation and terrorism activity.68  Yet what mar-
ginal effects the sanctions have had on the Iranian economy have been
outweighed by the symbolic and political externalities that they have
imposed on Iran.  Iran has been strictly persona non grata on the world
stage, retaining none of the legitimacy that other countries have with
the international community.
While their economic effects may be dubious, there is no doubt
that sanctions on Iran have been politically popular, leading every presi-
dent and Congress since 1979 to tout its values.  In 1987, President Rea-
gan’s executive order that prohibited nearly all imports from Iran
followed Congress’s successful House and Senate resolutions calling a
ban for Iranian imports.69  Following a period of relative executive
silence concerning Iranian issues, the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation
Act of 1992 significantly bolstered restrictions on U.S. exports to Iran,
adding mandatory sanctions to any foreign government that aided
Iran’s acquisition of “chemical, biological, nuclear, or destabilizing
numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons.”70  Moreover,
the Act ended any economic aid, adding threatening measures against
firms and individuals that targeted Iranian programs.71  Finally, the
Clinton administration’s aggressive containment policy is indicated by
the President’s executive order imposing across-the-board, unilateral
trade and investment sanctions on Iran.72
Other legislation has attempted to quell international threats and
hostile states.  The 1996 Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) was a harbinger of
increasingly worrying steps that Iran had taken towards gaining nuclear
arms.  The ISA focused on a larger, multilateral effort to curb Iran’s
extra-territorial reach by mandating U.S. penalties against foreign com-
panies that conduct certain business with Iran’s energy sector.73  In
2002, the alarming rise of Iran’s nuclear program led the George W.
Bush administration to take multiple approaches in limiting the coun-
try’s strategic capabilities.  Not only did President Bush deploy unique
65. HOSSEIN ASKARI ET AL., CASE STUDIES OF US ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 171 (2003).
66. Id.
67. UNITED STATES GOV’T ACCT. OFF., IRAN SANCTIONS: GOOD OR BAD? 3 (2008).
68. Id.
69. RICHARD N. HAASS, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 85 (1998).
70. Vahe Petrossian, Iran Back in the Firing Line, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Dec. 4, 1992.
71. HAASS, supra note 69, at 86.
72. Puneet Talwar, Iran in the Balance, FOREIGN AFF., Jul.–Aug. 2001, at 58, 61.
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rhetorical devices to condemn Iran strongly on an international stage,74
he also levied diplomatic sanctions as an attempt to foster dialogue on
specific regional issues.75  In contrast, the Obama administration’s
approach towards Iran has concentrated on directly negotiating with
Iran on the nuclear issue.  The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2012 (CISADA) amended the
Iran Sanctions Act to curtail petroleum-related activities as well as
restrict international banking relationships.76  The financial provisions
of CISADA prohibit entities owned or controlled by U.S. financial insti-
tutions from engaging in or benefiting Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps.77  The financial prohibitions strived to protect the U.S.
government’s domestic financial system from Iran’s illicit activities,
especially those that involved individuals and entities that engaged in
dangerous and sanctionable activities.78
Further legislation gives authority to the executive branch to con-
trol and subdue activity that engages sanctioned countries.  The Com-
prehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2012
(CISADA) expanded the Iran Sanctions Act significantly in order to
incentivize foreign governments from contracting with Iran, requiring
all companies that enter into U.S. government contracts to certify that
they are not violating any provision of the Iran Sanctions Act.79  The
extent of CISADA’s jurisdictional reach has yet to be tested,80 but its
ambitious intentions are clear—CISADA targets broad categories of
activities, from selling equipment to Iran to enhance or expand its oil
74. President Bush defined Iran as an enemy of the United States, categorizing the
country as part of the “axis of evil” with Iraq and North Korea. See KENNETH KATZMAN,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32048, IRAN: U.S. CONCERNS AND POLICY RESPONSES 58 (2012).
75. Id. at 58–59.  For the first time since 1979, the Bush administration committed
to direct dialogue with Iran.  In light of the U.S.’s engagement in Iraq, the administration
was perhaps wary of antagonizing Iran to a point that would jeopardize U.S. troops
deployed in the region.
76. KATZMAN, supra note 74, at 6.  Arguably, CISADA has heightened the punish-
ment that was originally imposed by the Iran Sanctions Act by requiring at least three out
of the nine possible sanctions be imposed on a violator.
77. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, CISADA—The New U.S. Sanctions on Iran 2 (2012),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/
CISADA_english.pdf.
78. Id. at 1–2.  Such sanctionable activities include, but are not limited to, develop-
ing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), providing terrorist organizations with support,
and engaging in money laundering by the Central Bank of Iran. Id.
79. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-195, 124 Stat. 1312 (2010).  The Iran Sanctions Act consists of various
“triggers” that would cause a firm to be sanctioned under ISA’s provisions.  For example,
companies that make more than a $20 million investment in Iran’s energy sector or sell
Iran weapons of mass destruction technology would trigger sanctions.  American firms, in
comparison, are already banned from investing in Iran.
80. Though it is unclear whether foreign companies with few or no business deal-
ings in the U.S. would successfully preclude U.S. courts from asserting jurisdiction, the
executive branch’s power to maintain a “sweeping sanctions” regime is unquestioned.
Congress “expanded, deepened, and formalized the sanctions in a comprehensive legisla-
tive effort to target Iran” through both IEEPA and CISADA. See United States v.
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refineries to discontinuing U.S. importation of Iranian delicacies.81  As
a result, new foreign banks that conduct transactions with Iranian enti-
ties are prevented from opening U.S. accounts.82  Companies’ fear that
their engagements would jeopardize any potential new U.S. business
opportunities may severely limit Iran’s access to the international finan-
cial system.
Finally, as a measure to sever Iran’s ties completely from the U.S.
banking system, the Treasury Department enacted a series of provisions
in 2008.  Though the Department stopped short of designating any
bank as a “money laundering entity” for Iran-related transactions, it
barred U.S. banks from handling any indirect transactions from Iranian
clients, typically called “U-turn transactions.”83  “U-turn transactions”
previously permitted U.S. banks to process payments from Iranian enti-
ties, as long as the transactions were initiated offshore and passed
through the U.S. for “dollar clearing.”84  After these transactions were
banned, U.S. clearing banks were required to look at wire-transfer
messages and freeze transferred assets that originated from any Iranian
bank.85
However, banks, such as Standard Chartered, were accused of
“wire stripping,” or removing codes from money transfers that would
have identified Iranian clients.86  Therefore, U.S. banks did not per-
form due diligence in determining that they were not financing terror-
ism.  In theory, the breadth of legislation, executive orders, and
administrative actions should have prevented any companies from even
considering transacting business with Iran.  In reality a lack of stringent
enforcement and prosecutorial willingness to overlook criminality ulti-
mately resulted in political pressure without actual results.
II. HISTORY AND STANDARD OF DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS
Contrary to the modern use of deferred prosecution for large
financial institutions, the traditional use of these agreements is rooted
in small measures to protect vulnerable persons in society.  Prosecutors
historically utilized deferred prosecutions as a way to impede future
criminal conduct without saddling defendants with the scarlet mark of a
criminal charge.87  For that reason, deferred prosecutions were mostly
used in the context of juvenile defendants and non-serious offenses, or
81. KATZMAN, supra note 74, at 9–28.
82. KATZMAN, supra note 75, at 73.
83. KATZMAN, supra note 74, at 32.
84. Kara Scannell & Tom Braithwaite, Size of StanChart problem U-turn dependent, FIN.
TIMES (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3cecd128-e0af-11e1-8d0f-00144feab4
9a.html#axzz2NdueSds3.
85. BBC, Q&A: Standard Chartered Iran Allegations, BBC NEWS, Dec. 10, 2012, availa-
ble at  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19157426.
86. Scannell & Braithwaite, supra note 84.
87. The Chicago Boys’ Court in 1914 used deferred prosecutions to avoid branding
juvenile offenders as criminals.  The Court noted that, “Having been found guilty, he is
stamped with a criminal record.” See JAMES A. INCIARDI ET. AL., DRUG CONTROL AND THE
COURTS 25 (1996) (quoting Judge Braude, who spoke at lengths about the implications of
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those whose criminal actions were presumably an outlier rather than an
indicator of future patterns of behavior.88  In order to be granted a
deferral, the offender first makes an admission of guilt and waives the
right to a speedy trial.  Then, in exchange for being criminally charged,
the offender commits to rehabilitation and when necessary, pays restitu-
tion to the victims.  The offender then agrees to abide by terms that the
prosecution sets, which always include a deferral period.  At the end of
the period, if the offender has followed the terms, the prosecutor may
dismiss the indictment.89  If the agreement has been breached, the
offender’s previous admission can be used to impeach the offender at a
later trial.
By utilizing deferred prosecution agreements in their original
capacity, the prosecutor fulfills three goals of the criminal justice sys-
tem.90  This use is limited to non-serious offenses, such as first-time mis-
demeanor charges, like possession of marijuana or retail theft,
especially if committed by a juvenile.91  Deferred prosecutions agree-
ments were never intended to manage corporate crime.  The offender,
first, has a chance to rehabilitate into society without suffering the col-
lateral consequences of a felony conviction (such as exclusion from fed-
eral financial education aid, voting, government benefits, public
housing, and jury service).  Because rehabilitation is community-based,
typically including counseling, training, and job placement,92 the
offender has extra support to help her avoid criminal activity.
Second, the offender is deterred from further participation in
criminal conduct by the agreement’s straightforward procedure and
the fear of certain prosecution if the agreement is materially breached.
When the prosecution sets a deferral period that marks the time in
which offender must follow the agreement’s terms, the time limit acts as
the light at the end of the tunnel, giving offenders a well-lit road to
freedom.
Third, insofar as retribution is concerned, because offenses that
trigger deferred prosecution are relatively minor and usually non-vio-
lent, the offender “pays” for his crimes by adhering to the terms of the
agreement for a period of time (typically a year).  Such terms may
include frequent check-ins with a law enforcement officer or the prose-
88. Candance Zierdt & Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate Deferred Prosecutions Through the
Looking Glass of Contract Policing, 96 KY. L.J. 1, 4 (2008); Joan McPhee, Deferred Prosecution
Agreements: Ray of Hope or Guilty Plea by Another Name?, 30 CHAMPION 12, 13 (Oct. 2006).
89. Greenblum, supra note 29, at 1864.
90. At least, it is hoped that the agreement fulfills the primary purpose of “facilitat-
ing the offender’s rehabilitation and reintegration into the law-abiding community and
the restoration of crime victims and communities, while avoiding the stigma and collat-
eral consequences associated with criminal charges and convictions.” MODEL PENAL
CODE: SENTENCING § 6.02A (Discussion Draft No. 4 2012).
91. THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-22.000 (2011). The Manual makes
clear that a major objective of pretrial diversion, which includes deferred prosecution
agreements, is to “save prosecutive and judicial resources for concentration on major
cases.”
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cutor’s office.93  As a practical matter, deferred prosecution avoids a
full criminal trial and preserves scarce prosecutorial and judicial
resources.94  In sum, the advantages of using deferred prosecution in
the context of individuals are two-fold: the offenders are spared from
suffering a lifetime of stigma “associated with processing and the resul-
tant change in self-image, associations, and behavior associated with the
negative societal reaction” attached to a criminal charge, and the justice
system benefits from a reduced docket congestion.95
The similarities between corporate deferrals and traditional crimi-
nal deferrals mainly revolve around procedure.  First, a prosecutor may
choose to file a criminal charge against the corporation, and the claim
will be dropped if the company complies with the agreement’s terms.96
Then, the company typically chooses to enter a probationary period in
which it agrees to enact substantial internal reforms and to cooperate
with the government.97  This process is similar to an individual offender
entering into rehabilitation after agreeing to abide by the agreement’s
terms.  The overarching purpose of a deferred prosecution is to facili-
tate an offender’s rehabilitation and re-integration into the community
while holding him accountable for his criminal conduct.98
In contrast, a corporation’s restitution is more extensive than what
is required of an individual.  The corporation first makes substantial
monetary payments to the government and submits to federal monitor-
ing.  If the corporation has not materially breached any terms of the
agreement and fulfilled its obligation, the prosecutor may dismiss the
charges.  Akin to individual offenders’ agreements, if the corporation
does not follow the agreement, the government may declare a breach
and proceed with criminal charges against the corporation.  These
93. Cf. Ben Poston & Daniel Bice, Some cases in deferred prosecution process raise eye-
brows, Milwaukee-Wisconsin J. Sentinel, Dec. 12, 2010, available at http://www.jsonline
.com/watchdog/watchdogreports/111733029.html.  Even deferred prosecution use for
individuals has its drawbacks because of the agreements’ wide deference to prosecutorial
discretion.  In Milwaukee, prosecutors gave deferred prosecutions to those charged with
driving while drunk, felony sexual assault, and high-volume drug trafficking. Id.
94. Greenblum, supra note 29, at 1866.
95. GENNARO F. VITO & DEBORAH G. WILSON, THE AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE SYS-
TEM 22 (1985).
96. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.02A (Discussion Draft No. 4 2012) (sug-
gesting that the prosecutor “may decline to charge or withdraw charges already filed with-
out prejudice” before agreeing to enter into a deferred prosecution agreement with the
accused); Christopher J. Christie & Robert M. Hanna, A Push Down the Road of Good Corpo-
rate Citizenship: The Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the U.S. Attorney for the District of
New Jersey and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1043, 1056 (2006) (“The filing
of a criminal charge is not a prerequisite to a deferred prosecution agreement. . .”). Cf.
United States v. Biomet Orthopedics Inc., No. 07-8133, 2007 WL 2964201, at *2 (D.N.J.
Sept. 28, 2007) (where the prosecution chose to file a criminal complaint before filing a
deferred prosecution agreement).
97. Ideally, by agreeing to cooperate, the corporation would provide enough infor-
mation to the government so prosecutors could build a case against individual employees.
However, such cases seem to have increasingly become a rarity.  See Peter Spivack & Sujit
Raman, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’: Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 160 (2008).
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agreements often include provisions in which the government is listed
as the sole decider as to whether a breach has occurred.99  As a result,
the question of whether a company actually breached the agreement is
not subject to an objective trier-of-fact’s judgment, but posed to the gov-
ernment, which might have an ancillary interest in protecting the status
of “successful” deferred prosecution agreements.
However, if the government incorrectly determined that a breach
occurred, the agreement is not subject to review.100  This predicament
is unlike most plea-bargaining scenarios, where if the government
thinks the defendant breached the agreement, it should “move to with-
draw from the agreement” and leave the decision of whether the defen-
dant’s actions do constitute a breach to the judge.101  But perhaps the
hardest part of deferred prosecutions to reconcile is the fact that gov-
ernment officials, in the corporate context, have made not made clear
how they will properly ensure banks’ compliance with agreements.102
Actual implementation is left to the wayside, despite prosecutors’ best
intentions.
A recent spike in deferred prosecution agreements has solidified
the path towards using them in the context of corporate criminal liabil-
ity.  The first variation came in 1992, when the government charged
Salomon Brothers for securities fraud violations.  The company agreed
to comply with the government’s request to reform, including restruc-
turing its management, paying $280 million in fines and forfeiture and
undertaking other internal measures to avoid future misconduct.103
99. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement between United States Department of
Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section, and Micrus Corporation and its Swiss subsidiary
Micrus S.A. (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/cftf/charg-
ingdocs/micrusagreement.pdf [hereinafter Micrus Deferred Prosecution Agreement];
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico,
(D.P.R.) available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/banco.pdf
[hereinafter Banco Deferred Prosecution Agreement] (“Should the United States deter-
mine during the term of this Agreement that BANCO POPULAR has committed any
federal crime commenced subsequent to the date of this Agreement, BANCO POPULAR
shall, in the sole discretion of the United States, thereafter be subject to prosecution for
any federal crimes of which the United States has knowledge.”); Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, United States v. Standard Chartered Bank, No. 12 – 00262 (Dec. 10, 2012
D.D.C.) available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/wp-content/uploads/
2012/12/Standard-Chartered-Bank-DPA.pdf [hereinafter Standard Chartered Deferred
Prosecution Agreement].
100. Candance Zierdt & Ellen S. Podgor, Back Against the Wall, 23 CRIM. JUST. 34, 36
(2008).
101. United States v. Gomez, 271 F.3d 779, 782 (8th Cir. 2001).
102. Cf. Crime Without Conviction: The Rise of Deferred Prosecution and Non Prosecution
Agreements, CORP. CRIME REP., Dec. 28, 2005, http://corporatecrimereporter.com/defer-
redreport.htm.  American Online, Inc., after entering into a deferred agreement with the
government for aiding and abetting securities fraud, was monitored by an independent
consultant hired by the Department of Justice.  It is unclear whether the company prop-
erly complied with agreement following the monitor process.
103. See Spivack & Raman, supra note 97, at 163; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Department of Justice and SEC Enter $290 Million Settlement with Salmon Brothers in
Treasury Securities Case (May 20, 1992); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Judge
Approves $27.8 Million Justice Department Antitrust Settlement with Salomon Brothers,
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Then, two years later, Prudential Securities entered into a similar agree-
ment with the U.S. Attorney’s office.104  The prosecuting attorney at
that time labeled the deferred prosecution “a very special situation” and
not something she “was likely to do again.”105  Yet ten years later,
deferred prosecutions had become the rule rather than the exception.
The agreements transformed into a “tool that prosecutors have” and a
“vehicle” in which to “show results.”106  Prosecutors were increasingly
comfortable with using deferred prosecutions as a regular tool to stave
off long trials.
The true advent of deferred prosecution agreements arrived after
the Holder Memorandum and Filip Memorandum were released.  In
1999, then-Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder wrote formal guide-
lines for organizational prosecutions.107  The memorandum stressed
that corporations should be subjected to the same “[v]igorous enforce-
ment of criminal laws against corporate wrongdoers” as individuals are
when they commit crimes; prosecutors should not hesitate to charge
“individual directors, officers, employees, or shareholders.”108  Then, in
2003, another memorandum was released that examined considera-
tions that cropped up after the Enron scandal.109  The Thompson
104. Prudential was charged with securities fraud by misleading investors about the
rates of return and the tax status of the investments. See F. Joseph Warin & Jason C.
Schwartz, Deferred Prosecution: The Need for Specialized Guidelines for Corporate Defendants, 23 J.
CORP. LAW. 121, 125–26 (1997).  The difference in this case was that the government
submitted a pre-trial diversion agreement instead of a deferred prosecution agreement.
105. But see Interview with Mary Jo White, 19 CORP. CRIME REP. 48 (2005), available at
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/maryjowhiteinterview010806.htm [hereinafter
Interview with Mary Jo White].  The prosecutor at the time was Mary Jo White, former U.S.
Attorney of the Southern District of New York and President Obama’s nominee as Chair
of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
106. Id.
107. Spivack & Raman, supra note 97, at 164.  Currently, Eric Holder resides as the
Attorney General and has also been criticized for his relaxed approach to corporations.
In response to his orders to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
to stop investigating claims that Beazer Homes USA, a home builder, engaged in mort-
gage fraud, the inspector general of HUD wrote a letter that lamented, “As a law enforce-
ment official for over 40 years . . . I have never witnessed a like action in any of my varied
dealings.” See Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, As Wall St. Polices Itself, Prosecutors Use
Softer Approach, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2011, at A1.
108. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., to All
Component Heads and United States Attorneys (June 16, 1999), available at http://www
.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999/charging-corps.pdf [hereinafter
Holder Memorandum].  Later, when Holder became the Attorney General under Presi-
dent Obama’s first administration, he was also roundly criticized for his policy of offering
deferred prosecution for large financial institutions that break federal criminal laws. See
OFFICE OF OREGON SENATOR JEFF MERKLEY, Merkley Blasts ‘Too Big to Jail’ Policy for Lawbreak-
ing Banks (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.merkley.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/
?id=42a606e4-7c45-42ed-8348-c77c508f9281 (in which Oregon Senator Jeff Merkley
opined that the Justice Department “appears to have firmly set the precedent that no
bank, bank employee, or bank executive can be prosecuted even for serious criminal
actions if that bank is a large, systematically important financial institution.”).
109. Former Enron Corporation President Jeffrey Skilling received 24 years and
four months in prison for numerous counts of fraud and conspiracy after Enron col-
lapsed into bankruptcy in 2001.  John R. Emshwiller, Skilling Gets 24 Years in Prison, WALL.
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Memorandum emphasized that its revisions focused on “increas[ing]
emphasis on and scrutiny of the authenticity of the corporation’s cooper-
ation” with government investigations.110  Most importantly, the memo-
randum made clear that cooperators would be rewarded for voluntary
disclosure.
The Thompson Memorandum’s emphasis on avoiding collateral
consequences of prosecution was most likely a reactionary response
influenced by the Arthur Andersen case.111  The Memorandum
stressed that prosecutors should take into account a multitude of fac-
tors before pursuing corporate criminal convictions, including the “sub-
stantial consequences to a corporation’s officers, directors, employees,
and shareholders”; “non-penal sanctions that may accompany a convic-
tion”; and the “pervasiveness of the criminal conduct and the adequacy
of the corporation’s compliance programs” to avoid impact on inno-
cent third parties.112
In the Arthur Anderson case, prosecutors were forced to employ
criminal charges on the former Chicago accounting giant for its inte-
gral role in the Enron scandal.  As Enron began the slow march to
bankruptcy, the company ordered Andersen employees to destroy all
audit material, except for basic “work papers.”113  Employees then
shredded tons of documents over several weeks, destroying evidence
that was subject to the subpoena against Enron.  An indictment and
subsequent prosecution contributed to the company’s disintegration,
even though reports indicated that over 95% of Arthur Andersen’s
employees had no connection with the wrongdoing that led to the com-
pany’s collapse.114  Tens of thousands of people were subsequently
unemployed, and the firm’s collapse changed the accounting industry
irreparably.115  In short, Arthur Andersen received the corporate
110. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Dep. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Jus., to
Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Att’ys, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (2003) [hereinafter
Thompson Memorandum].
111. Indeed, as a result of the Arthur Andersen collapse, the Department of Justice
turned towards using deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements
(NPAs).  In NPAs, the government agrees to not file criminal charges against the defen-
dant in exchange for a term of compliance.  The discussion of NPAs is beyond the scope
of this Note, but for a general discussion of NPA, see John N. Gallo & Daniel M. Green-
field, The Corporate Criminal Defendant’s Illusory Right to Trial: A Proposal for Reform, 28
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 525, 536 (2014).
112. Id.
113. Daniel Kadlec, Enron: Who’s Accountable?, TIME (Jan. 13, 2002), http://www
.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1001636,00.html.
114. McPhee, supra note 88, at 12.  It could also be argued that Arthur Andersen’s
refusal to accept responsibility led to criminal charges and implement structural reforms.
Later, the Supreme Court eventually overturned Andersen’s conviction, Arthur Andersen,
LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005), but the company was completely disintegrated
by that time.
115. The “Big 5” accounting firms were turned into the “Big 4.” See Christopher A.
Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: The Thompson
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“death sentence” for its impropriety.116  It is not a surprise, then, that
the Thompson Memorandum would advise prosecutors to avoid a com-
pany’s total collapse by advocating softer prosecution methods.117
Finally, a third memorandum emerged from the Department of
Justice and endeavored to add guidance to prosecutorial decision.  The
2008 Filip Memorandum expanded on previous memoranda by adding
a ninth factor for prosecutors’ consideration.  The memorandum
rejected any prosecutorial analysis that would equivocate cooperation
with the corporation with waiving the corporation’s attorney-client priv-
ilege or attorney work product protection.118  Further, the memoran-
dum, while urging the prosecutors to “aggressively enforce the law” and
“promote fair outcomes for the American people,” acknowledged that,
by the same principle, prosecutors could consider “collateral conse-
quences of a corporate criminal conviction or indictment” in determin-
ing whether to actually charge the corporation with a criminal
offense.119  However, it is not clear to what extent any prosecution
could affect corporations, and the “collateral consequences” that follow
are unsubstantiated by any Department of Justice memoranda.  Banks,
in their haste to avoid prosecutions, have offered no empirical evidence
for their claims.120  It is difficult to fathom the process for which this
decision to avoid prosecution was determined, as it is unclear that pros-
ecutors, the Department of Justice, or any other government official
looked at economic studies to determine the “collateral consequences.”
At best, the public is asked to take the government’s word of these
effects.
Thus, the memoranda seem to encourage prosecutors to deliber-
ate the potential economic catastrophes that could be provoked by a
criminal conviction. A corporation’s alleged financial well-being was
paramount to any wrongs that the corporation committed.  The final
guidelines are as follows:
116. Scott Horsley, Enron and the Fall of Arthur Andersen (National Public Radio
broadcast May 26, 2006), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyId=5435092.
117. The additional need to avoid debarment (which prevents the company from
doing business with the government) and exclusion from government contracts (espe-
cially for companies that depend on government contracts for survival) also incentivizes
prosecutors to use deferred prosecution agreements over traditional criminal and civil
litigation. See Zierdt & Podgor, supra note 88, at 5.
118. Memorandum from Mark R. Filip, Dep. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Jus, to Heads
of Dep’t Components and U.S. Atty’s, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, (2008), available at http://
www.justice.gov/dag/readingroom/dag-memo-08282008.pdf [hereinafter Filip Memo-
randum].  The Filip Memorandum was incorporated directly into the United States Attor-
neys’ Manual as USAM 9-28.100, et seq.
119. Id. at 1, 17.
120. When questioned, nominee for the Securities and Exchange Commission
Mary Jo White, said that “prosecutors should consider [collateral consequences of a crimi-
nal indictment] before proceeding.”  Similarly, Attorney General Eric Holder has said
that the size of some institutions “has an inhibiting impact” on the department’s ability to
bring certain cases.  Jason M. Breslow, SEC Nominee Signals Cautious Approach to Prosecuting
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1. the nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of
harm to the public;
2. the pervasiveness of the wrongdoing within the corporation;
3. the corporation’s history of similar conduct;
4. the corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdo-
ing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation;
5. the existence and adequacy of the corporation’s compliance
program;
6. the corporation’s remedial actions;
7. the collateral consequences, including disproportionate harm
to shareholders and others;
8. the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for
the corporation’s malfeasance; and
9. the adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory enforce-
ment actions.121
The added ninth factor, the adequacy of remedies, underscores
the importance of providing just compensation for those who were
harmed by corporate conduct.  Finally, the Filip Memorandum empha-
sizes that charging a corporation with minor misconduct is appropriate
when there has been pervasive wrongdoing and many employees joined
in the wrongdoing.122  On the surface, the Holder, Thompson, and
Filip Memoranda administered instructions for prosecutors uneasy
about using deferred prosecution as a procedure to avoid actual crimi-
nal charges.  In reality, it is debatable how much prosecutors actually
followed and implemented the memorandum’s suggestions, consider-
ing the considerable leeway that they later gave corporations.
Should prosecutors find the memoranda devoid or lacking in
unambiguous guidelines, there are other sources of legal authority that
succinctly comment on the procedures and standards for deferred pros-
ecution agreements.  These sources include the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual
and U.S. Department of Justice Criminal Resource Manual.123  The
U.S. Attorneys’ Manual suggests that prosecution should be declined
when there is “[n]o substantial federal interest which would be served
by prosecution; [t]he person is subject to effective prosecution in
another jurisdiction; or [t]here exists an adequate non-criminal alterna-
121. Filip Memorandum, supra note 118, at 3–4.
122. Id. at 5–6. The memorandum goes on to stress that the theory of respondeat
superior would be inappropriate to use when wrongdoing was conducted by a single
employee.
123. As internal policy manuals, the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual and U.S. Department
of Justice Criminal Resource Manual are not entitled to Chevron deference because
“‘interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines’ . . . are beyond the Chevron pale.”  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,
234 (2001) (quoting Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)).  Instead, the
manuals are given weight based upon their power to persuade. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see also Stephen M. DeGenaro, Note, Why Should We Care About
an Agency’s Special Insight?, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909, 923–26 (2013) (discussing how
the courts should account for the fact that an agency has “special insight” into interpreta-
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tive to prosecution.”124  The comments further note that no prosecu-
tion should be initiated against any person unless the prosecutor
believes that “an unbiased trier of fact” would probably find the person
guilty.125  Moreover, the prosecutor should consider “the nature and
severity of the sanctions that could be imposed, the likelihood that an
adequate sanction would in fact be imposed, and the effect of such a
non-criminal disposition on federal law enforcement interests.”126  The
Department of Justice Criminal Resource manual, in comparison, dis-
cusses the Pre-Trial Diversion Program, which seeks to “prevent future
criminal activity” and also conserve judicial resources through diverting
offenders from “traditional criminal justice processing into a program
of supervision and services administered by the U.S. Probation Ser-
vice.”127  The difference between a pre-trial diversion and deferred
prosecution is negligible.128  However, the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual rec-
ommends that pre-trial diversion only be used in cases concerning indi-
vidual defendants, not corporations.129  Further, any offense that is
related to “national security or foreign affairs” may not be eligible for
pre-trial diversion consideration.130
Prosecutors attribute their decision to eschew traditional criminal
remedies in favor of deferred prosecutions to a substantial number of
legal sources.  It can be argued that the idea of prosecutorial discretion
presents itself as an attractive, simple, and elegant solution in face of
messy procedural hurdles.  But though it is true that prosecutors can
“avoid the black-and-white decision of indicting”131 by choosing other
avenues for pursuing crimes, the freedom to choose whatever mecha-
nism suits the prosecutor’s favor can be easily abused without a system-
atic and comprehensive check on prosecutorial discretion.  Most
crucially, when national security interests are at risk, the idea that prose-
cutors receive unrestricted deference to their choices seems incongru-
124. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-27.220 (2002).
125. Id.
126. Id. at § 9-27.250.
127. Id. at § 9-22.000.  During a pre-trial diversion, offenders must plead guilty to
their offenses.  Offenders are then diverted at the “pre-charge stage,” and those who suc-
cessfully complete the program will either not be charged or have the charges against
them dismissed.  Those who fail the pre-trial diversion program because of a breach of
the agreement are subsequently prosecuted for their original offense.
128. Programs that involve deferral or diversion of usual prosecutorial or adjudica-
tive processes are known as deferred prosecution, pretrial diversion, pretrial intervention,
or any combination thereof. See 21A AM. JUR. 2D CRIMINAL LAW § 866 (2012).  Participa-
tion in this program is purely voluntary, and the participant must waive her right to a
speedy trial and applicable statute of limitations. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED
STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-22.200 (2002).
129. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-22.100 (2011).
However, during the Prudential Securities debacle, the U.S. Attorneys’ Office explained
that a pre-trial diversion agreement would impose the same sanctions as those which
would have resulted from a criminal conviction. As a result, the government submitted a
pre-trial diversion agreement that applied to the corporation but not individuals. See
Warin & Schwartz, supra note 104, at 126.
130. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-22.100 (2011).
131. Bloomberg News, U.S. Deferring Cases Against Firms Promising to Behave, CHI.





      05/20/2014   11:05:20
35013-nde_28-2 Sheet No. 114 Side A      05/20/2014   11:05:20
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-2\NDE208.txt unknown Seq: 21 14-MAY-14 13:25
2014] THE PRICE OF JUSTICE 651
ous to the idea that punishment should, in the end, preclude offenders
from thinking that they can “escape prosecution merely by returning
the spoils of his/her crime.”132  Therefore, deferred prosecution agree-
ments should be utilized not with eager zeal, but careful scrutiny and a
modicum of hesitation.
III. DEFERRED PROSECUTIONS AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS:
DANGERS AND POLITICAL ERRORS
Deferred prosecutions have been well established in the corporate
context.  However, until 2008, they had never been applied in cases
involving international economic sanctions.  The upending conse-
quences of the financial crisis signaled to financial institutions, espe-
cially ones that were questioned for their role in the mortgage crisis,
that the Justice Department’s blessing of deferred prosecutions was “an
important step away from the more aggressive prosecutorial practices
seen in some cases under their predecessors.”133  Allowing the use of
such prosecutions in this context is inconsistent with the principles of
criminal legal theory and any current legislation that governs interna-
tional economic sanctions.
In the course of litigation against non-financial corporations,
courts have repeatedly held that corporate defendants that had a rela-
tionship with the Iranian government or Iranian entities were crimi-
nally liable for violating economic sanctions with Iran.  When a
company violates regulations that prohibit shipments of equipment to
Iran, the company will typically be convicted under the Iranian
Embargo, which was issued as an Executive Order under the authority
of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).134
Courts have not been persuaded by various defenses attempting to jus-
tify breaching the embargo, including accusations that executive orders
were vague because they failed to provide adequate or fair notice and
complaints that companies must fulfill contractual obligations under
the doctrine of necessity because foreign workers and families in Iran
depend on the shipment of goods.135  In fact, the embargo casts a wide
net over a multitude of incidents, discouraging companies from even
indirectly transacting with sanctioned states.  Even companies that
merely facilitate joint ventures to sanctioned states are held liable for
facilitating, financing, or approving transactions between non-affiliated
third parties and embargoed countries.  In one instance, a U.S. com-
pany that underwrote transactions was charged with violating sanctions,
as its original Chinese proceeds eventually trickled to the parent com-
132. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-27.230 (2002).
133. Second Circuit Affirms SDNY Ruling that Prosecutors Denied Defendants’ Sixth Amend-
ment Rights; DOJ Issues new Principles for Prosecution of Business Organizations, SULLIVAN &
CROMWELL (Sept. 3, 2008), http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/2011
0629bank/sullivan.pdf.
134. United States v. Hescorp, 801 F.2d 70, 72–73 (2d Cir. 1986).
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pany’s operations in Sudan.136  This strict interpretation of IEEPA is
not common, as courts regularly defer to the public policy reasons
behind the sanctions.  For courts, justifications that “aim to induce
Iran’s government to reduce the threat that . . . Iran poses to United
States interests” are enough to quash any hints of impropriety.137
Similarly, prosecutors have not shied away from levying harsh
sentences against non-financial corporations that violate economic
sanctions.  In particular, the government does not have any reluctance
in pursuing claims against corporations when the companies at fault are
those that export tangible products to sanctioned countries.  While the
heads of corporations have been sentenced to a few years of imprison-
ment, the corporations themselves have been sentenced to millions of
dollars in criminal monetary fines and probation.  Those that have
been indicted have diverse functions, from aviation manufacturers138 to
telecommunications designers.139  Punishment has ranged from civil
penalties140 to corporate probation.141  For example, when one corpo-
ration was found liable for transferring illegal exports, the government
has sought more than $100 million in fines and additionally levied
criminal convictions against the company for its export violations.142
There, the U.S. Attorney intended to “send a clear message that illegally
exporting [the United States’] most important secrets will be prose-
cuted and punished.”143 Perhaps the government’s varied and vacillat-
ing leniency towards banks compared to non-financial institutions
stems from the easily established connection that can be made between
products and subsequent consequences: a company’s products that are
136. Erica Fung, Regulatory Competition in International Capital Markets: Evidence from
China in 2004–2005, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 243, 265, 272 (2006).
137. Bassidji v. Goe, 413 F.3d 928, 934–35 (9th Cir. 2005).
138. Balli Aviation Ltd. was criminally charged in 2010 for conspiring to export
Boeing aircrafts to Iran.  The company paid a $2 million criminal fine and was on corpo-
rate probation for five years.  The corporation and its subsidiary, Balli Group PLC, also
has to submit results from an independent audit of its export compliance to OFAC for the
next five years. U.S. BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., DON’T LET THIS HAPPEN TO YOU: AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO U.S. EXPORT CONTROL LAW 9–10 (2010), available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/
complianceandenforcement/dontletthishappentoyou_2010.pdf.
139. Allied Telesis Labs, a company that designed telecommunication equipment
and systems, pled guilty to conspiring with another corporation to trade with Iran and
eventually execute a $95 million contract with Iranian telecommunications companies.
The company was fined $500,000 in criminal charges and placed on probation for two
years. Id. at 29.
140. Thermon Manufacturing Company’s charged subsidiaries voluntarily disclosed
violations and cooperated fully with the government’s investigation into their exports of
heat tracing equipment to Iran, Syria, and Libya.  In return, the subsidiaries agreed to pay
a total of $176,000 in combined civil penalties. Id. at 28.
141. Proclad International Pipelines was sentenced for conspiring to illegally
export nickel alloyed pipes to Iran.  Proclad paid a $100,000 administrative penalty, a
criminal fine of $100,000, and was sentenced to five years of corporate probation. Id. at
36.
142. U.S. Defense Contractor to Pay $100 Million Penalty and Face Criminal Conviction for
Export Violations, Export Controls and Economic Sanctions Update (Sidley Austin LLP),
Apr. 17, 2007, at 1–2.  ITT, a leading manufacturer of military night vision, admitted to
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sold and used in Iran are easily connected to Iran’s derived benefits.144
Whereas one could argue that the sheer volume of money that flows in
and out of global financial institutions only peripherally benefits an
invested country, proponents of prosecutorial leniency have a much
harder argument against criminally punishing a company when its
products are directly given to the Iranian government or companies.
Similarly, private individuals that initiate deals with Iran are given
little leeway when they violate economic sanctions.  The extent to which
individuals are liable for their transfers to sanctioned countries
depends on the scope of a court’s IEEPA reading.  Predominantly,
courts apply IEEPA broadly and prohibit transfer of funds on behalf of
another entity, whether or not the transfer included a fee for the defen-
dant’s service.145  When courts find that individuals willingly disobey
the sanctions, the criminal charges brought under IEEPA are sus-
tained.146  Individuals who knew that transactions were taking place
with sanctioned countries were roundly condemned.147  In one
instance, a Taiwan national was sentenced to forty-two months in prison
for conspiring to export missile components from the United States to
Iran.148  There, the defendant communicated and coordinated with co-
144. As part of its transgressions, Balli Aviation, Ltd., entered into lease agreements
that permitted an Iranian airline to use its aircrafts for flights in and out of Iran. See
Office of Public Affairs, U.K. Firm Pleads Guilty to Illegally Exporting Boeing 747 Aircraft to
Iran, DEPT. OF JUSTICE (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/February/10-
nsd-131.html.
145. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1702, 1705(h) (2012); United States v. Banki, 685 F.3d 99 (2d
Cir. 2012) (where a defendant was found guilty of IEEPA violations because the transfer
of funds on behalf of another constituted a “service” prohibited by IEEPA’s regulations
banning the exportation or sale from the United States to Iran, even if the service was not
performed for a fee).
146. United States v. Hescorp, 801 F.2d 70, 77 (2d. Cir. 1986) (“[A] requirement of
willfulness makes a vagueness challenge especially difficult to sustain.”). See also United
States v. Chitron Elec. Co. Ltd., 668 F. Supp. 2d 298 (D. Mass. 2009) (in which a manager
of a U.S.-based electronics company was convicted of conspiring to violate U.S. export
laws and illegally exporting items and subsequently sentenced to eleven months imprison-
ment, three years of supervised release, and a monetary fine).
147. See United States v. Harb, 111 F.3d 130 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that ample
evidence established that the defendant knew selling to Iraq violated the embargo accom-
panying the gulf War, as evidenced by the great lengths to which he went to conceal that
the users of his exports were in Iraq); United States v. Reyes, 270 F.3d 1158 (7th Cir.
2001) (finding that the defendant’s conviction of exporting military aircraft parts des-
tined for Iran was supported by evidence that the defendant received documents indicat-
ing that the parts were forwarded to Iran and thus willfully violated IEEPA); United States
v. Elashi, 440 F. Supp. 2d 536 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (holding that evidence showing the defen-
dant faxed documents that showed his investments in a corporation were made by a desig-
nated terrorist’s wife was sufficient to support a conviction under IEEPA).
148. BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., TAIWAN EXPORTER IS SENTENCED TO THREE AND A
HALF YEARS FOR CONSPIRING TO EXPORT MISSILE COMPONENTS FROM THE U.S. TO IRAN
(August 30, 2010), available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2010/doj08302010.htm; See
also U.S. BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., supra note 138, at 34, available at http://www.bis.doc
.gov/complianceandenforcement/dontletthishappentoyou_2010.pdf. (Traian Bujduve-
anu pled guilty to conspiracy to violate IEEPA and the Arms Export Control Act in con-
nection with his role in trying to export civilian and military aircraft parts to Iran.
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conspirators around the world to facilitate the transfer of exports, tak-
ing requests for U.S.-manufactured goods from Iranian customers.
That the goods were not actually transferred was not enough to miti-
gate the defendant’s criminal charges.149  Further, in another case, the
defendant’s actions were a microcosm of financial institutions’ actions:
Anvari-Hamedani, doctor of Iranian descent practicing in the United
States, transferred funds from his U.S. account to intermediary banks,
which then forwarded the funds to an Iranian bank.150  The defen-
dant’s motions to dismiss the indictment for violating IEEPA and fed-
eral money laundering laws were denied and he was found guilty of 38
felony counts, resulting in a forfeiture of $650,000, a fine of $500,000,
and 60 days of imprisonment.151  In sum, the government’s consistency
in imposing criminal charges against individuals suggests its proclivity
for criminally prosecuting those who personally transfer money to sanc-
tioned countries.  Yet this enthusiasm for prosecuting individuals is
starkly contrasted with its unwillingness to enter into anything but
deferred prosecution agreements with large financial institutions.
Presently, the gulf between purported penalties and actual punish-
ment is ever-widening. As recent as May 2012, President Barack Obama
signed an executive order authorizing the U.S. Treasury Department to
publicly identify anyone and any business in “evasive and deceptive
activities” and ban them from participating in the U.S. financial sys-
tem.152  Yet in December 2012, Standard Chartered Bank entered into
a deferred prosecution agreement with the U.S. government, receiving
no criminal penalties or hindrances for continuing business in the
United States.153 This penalty is inconsistent with the Comprehensive
Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA),
which warns that financial institutions that open or maintain accounts
prohibited by section 104(c) could be subject to criminal penalties up
to $1,000,000, and individuals can be imprisoned for up to twenty
149. In fact, an individual conspiring to breach Iranian sanctions are given just as
much punishment as those who actually violate the sanction.  For example, Reece Roth, a
professor at the University of Tennessee, engaged in a conspiracy to transmit export con-
trolled technical data to Chinese and Iranian nationals.  Roth was sentenced to forty-eight
months in prison and two years of supervised released. See Fung, supra note 136, at 25.
150. United States v. Anvari-Hamedani, 378 F. Supp. 2d 821, 825 (N.D. Ohio 2005).
The indictment also alleged that the defendant engaged in “hawala” transfers, which
involve payment to an individual “hawaladar,” who then arranges for funds located in
another country to be paid to the designated Iranian recipient.
151. In addition to these penalties, the State Medical Board of Ohio also stripped
Anvari-Hamedani of his medical license. See Letter from Mohammad Anvari-Hamedani
to Anvari-Hamedani (Aug. 8, 2007), available at http://med.ohio.gov/formala/35032727
.pdf.
152. Obama Stiffens Penalties for Violating Iran, Syria Sanctions, RADIO FREE EUROPE
RADIO LIBERTY (May 2, 2012), http://www.rferl.org/content/obama_stiffens_penalties_
for_violating_iran_syria_sanctions/24567288.html.  When the executive order was
released, the then-Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence supple-
mented the decision by stating, “Whoever tries to evade our sanctions does so at the
expense of the people of Syria and Iran, and they will be held accountable.”
153. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Standard Chartered Bank,
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years.154  As such, prosecutors seem to have deviated from their previ-
ous inclination of levying heavy criminal fines and prison time for sanc-
tions violations, whether for an individual or corporation.  The
question remains: What drove this prosecutorial shift?
Wary prosecutors may not treat banks and non-financial companies
and individuals consistently, but there are other ways to remedy an
unfair punishment scheme.  At the very least, if prosecutors are uneasy
about pressing criminal charges, the Office of Foreign Asset Control
(OFAC) could adhere to the enforcement of previous cases and pre-
scribe monetary penalties proportional to the amount of profit that the
company earned from sanctions violations.  New York company Essie
Cosmetics, for instance, formerly employed an individual corporate
officer that knowingly sold and exported nail care products to Iranian
distributors. The company settled for $450,000 with the federal prose-
cutors, but the total transaction was valued at $33,299.155  In essence,
while a small cosmetics corporation and its officer were fined approxi-
mately 1351% of its total transactions, a large financial institution was
only punished for a tiny fraction of its distributions.  To add insult to
injury, OFAC seemed to enact such a high penalty because Essie Cos-
metics failed to self-report the violation, and there were vague “efforts
to evade sanctions.”156
Perhaps prosecutors’ fear of pursuing criminal charges stems from
the inevitable collateral consequences that follow.  If the appropriate
criminal sanctions were applied, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration may revoke a bank’s insurance for engaging “in unsafe or
unsound practices in conducting the business of the depository institu-
tion.”157  As a result, banks will be unable to conduct business, will be
cut off from pension funds, and ultimately will cost its charter to oper-
ate in the United States.158  The bank’s reputation would most likely be
tarnished, as investors would be wary about placing money or trust in
the institution.
Prosecutors’ avoidance of criminal sanctions as applied to financial
institutions is manifested in the manner in which the Department of
Justice approached Standard Chartered compared to Essie Cosmetics.
Standard Chartered enacted an elaborate system of computer process-
154. Section 104(c) requires that the Secretary of Treasury to issue regulations to
prohibit the opening or maintenance of a pay-through account by a foreign financial
institution that knowingly engages in “prohibited activities,” including but not limited to
Iran’s efforts to acquire or develop weapons of mass destruction; Iran’s efforts to support
for organizations designated as foreign terrorist organizations or for acts of international
terrorism; the activities of a person subject to UN Security Council financial sanctions. See
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-195, §104(c), 124 Stat. 1312 (2010).
155. Essie Cosmetics Ltd. And Individual Corporate Officer Settle Iranian Transactions Reg-
ulations Allegations, OFAC Recent Actions, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Apr. 10, 2012), http://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/04102012_essie.pdf.
156. Id.
157. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a) (2012).
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ing codes to conceal each transaction payment’s Iranian origin.159  In
that case, the bank acknowledged that its total transactions with Iranian
clients amounted to approximately $241.9 billion, and the banks met
$6.8 billion in pre-tax profits, yet Standard Chartered only paid $674
million as a civil penalty.160  Standard Chartered’s profits are typical of
what a bank would earn through transactions, though the percentage
varies by the type of deal being sought.161  The government’s inconsis-
tency in affording banks and manufacturers the same legal treatment
underscores its preference (and perhaps fear) for interfering with
banks’ success.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF DPA ABUSE: FROM PROSECUTION
TO SHAREHOLDERS
The amount of prosecutorial discretion is troubling in cases of
deferred prosecution agreements, given that prosecutors have the sole
power to decide whether to prosecute a corporation without any judi-
cial oversight.  Because prosecutorial discretion resides in the power of
the executive branch, as “the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-
suited to judicial review,”162 the prosecutors have wide discretion to
assist the President in his duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.”163  Therefore, prosecutors have broad agency in how they
want to exercise their power within the American system of
adjudication.164
In deferred prosecutions, the judicial role is similarly minimal.
Deferred prosecutions are negotiated and implemented exclusively by
the prosecutor, giving them the ability to apply sanctions without crimi-
nally charging the offender.  The criticisms that accompany this limited
role are twofold.  First, there has been no proof offered that giving cor-
159. Standard Chartered started providing banking services to Iranian clients in
1993.  The Central Bank of Iran asked Standard Chartered to remove any reference to
Iran in Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT)
messages, which is the international system to transmit payment messages to financial
institutions.  Though external legal counsel warned that the New York office needed to
obtain full transactional information about the payments in order to decide whether they
should freeze the assets, the system of wire-transfer checks were continuously and system-
atically abused. See Standard Chartered Bank Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra
note 152, at Attachment A 7-15; BBC, Q&A: Standard Chartered Iran Allegations, BBC NEWS,
Dec. 10, 2012, available at  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19157426.
160. The total paid fine was only .28 percent of the total transactions Standard
Charter made with Iranian entities. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 153,
at 2, Attachment A 17.
161. Typically, in global equities, the total gross “spread” or profit of the deal
ranges from three to seven percent of the transaction.  However, the number varies across
equity, investment grade debt, and high yield bonds.  Telephone Interview with Spencer
Fertig, former Equity Capital Markets Analyst, Morgan Stanley (Mar. 20, 2013).
162. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
163. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
164. James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Discretion, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1521, 1554–55 (1981) (“[P]rosecutors are not held to anything remotely like what due
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porations a deferral option actually reduces recidivism rates.165  Sec-
ond, deferral minimizes the judicial role in interfering with
prosecution’s decision.  Though the U.S. Code advises prosecutors to
submit deferred agreements for court approval,166 there is no case law
that suggests judges have turned down the use of such agreements,167
and many agreements are not submitted at all to courts.168  Also, with
the exception of nebulous factors from various Justice Department
memoranda, prosecutors do not have adequate guidelines to help them
reach a conclusion of who or what would be an appropriate entity to
criminally charge.  Courts, likewise, must presume that prosecutors
have “properly discharged their official duties” in deciding whether to
indict or enter an agreement.169
Prosecutors’ wide range of discretion virtually guarantees that insti-
tutions remain unpunished for corporate individuals’ decisions.  Their
“tremendous leverage” is tantamount to “life and death powers over
people and companies.”170  Normally, under the theory of respondeat
superior, when the individual commits the crime within the scope of
employment and with the intent to benefit the corporation, the corpo-
ration may still be held criminally liable.171  The entity is punished
based on the public policy determination that liability for acts commit-
ted within the scope of employment should be allocated to the
employer as a cost of participating in the business that gave rise to the
conduct.172  Then, because corporate criminal conduct also violates
165. Since 2008, Swiss banking giant, UBS, has entered into several deferred prose-
cution agreements and settlements for money laundering, tax evasion, conspiracy to rig
municipal bond derivatives, and defrauding customers who purchased auction-rate secur-
ities. Still, the bank maintains a heavy record of recidivism, apologizing as recently as 2012
for manipulating interest rates in the Libor-rate setting scandal. See James B. Stewart, For
UBS, a Record of Averting Prosecution, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 20, 2012, at B1. Cf. WASH. STATE INSTI.
FOR PUB. POL’Y, DEFERRED PROSECUTION OF DUI CASES IN WASHINGTON STATE: EVALUATING
THE IMPACT ON RECIDIVISM 10 (Aug. 2007), http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/07-08-1901
.pdf (noting that DUI defendants received deferred prosecution recidivated at lower rates
than defendants who pled guilty or were convicted of a DUI).
166. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2012). The time to file an indictment is tolled
during the “period of delay during which prosecution is deferred by the attorney for the
Government pursuant to written agreement with the defendant, with the approval of the
court, for the purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate his good conduct.”
167. Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 922
(2007).
168. See Warin & Schwartz, supra note 104, at 122 n.4.
169. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting United States v.
Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926)).
170. But see Interview with Mary Jo White, supra note 105.
171. See United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972) (where
the corporation, a hotel, was held liable under the Sherman Act for acts of the hotel’s
purchasing agent, who threatened a supplier with loss of the hotel’s business unless the
supplier paid a trade association’s assessment).
172. See C.B. ex rel. L.B. v. Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, 726 N.W.2d
127,135 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007); Unruh-Haxton v. Regents of University of California, 162
Cal. App. 4th 343 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that public policies under respondeat
superior include preventing the recurrence of tortious conduct; giving greater assurance
of compensation for the victim; and ensuring that the victim’s losses will be borne by
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civil and administrative regulatory processes, corporate individuals are
also charged.  Corporate liability allows prosecutors to bring criminal
charges while providing incentives for managers to patrol ranking
officers and employers, creating a law-abiding corporate culture.173
Critics of the respondeat superior theory allege that individuals have no
showing of direct personal involvement necessary to convict a manager
for company violations.174  With deferred prosecutions, both the indi-
vidual and corporation escape criminal liability.
However, the public policy reason of protecting the public has
repeatedly trumped fears of judicial overreach.  Allegedly, the public is
innocent and does not have the resources to protect itself, while the
corporate official has the authority and responsibility to correct and
prevent violations.175  Where corporate individuals have defied sanc-
tions by making decisions at the highest levels to willingly violate sanc-
tions, they have not been charged with a crime.176  Actual intent to
violate the sanctions can be imputed on these individuals, as they
repeatedly hid transactions originating from Iran by eliminating identi-
fication data and employing sophisticated techniques to evade com-
puter recognition.177  By such actions, these individuals violated the
IEEPA by “willfully commit[ing]” an unlawful act, which calls for a
potential fine of $1,000,000 and imprisonment lasting up to twenty
years.178  That individuals are completely immune from such punish-
ment is irreconcilable with both the statute’s terms and the theory of
corporate agent liability.
Finally, the principles of criminal justice are disregarded by the
continuous use of deferred prosecution agreements.  Prosecutors may
justify deferred prosecutions in the corporate context by pointing to
173. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, § 9-28.200(A)
(“Indicting corporations for wrongdoing enables the government to be a force for posi-
tive change of corporate culture, and a force to prevent, discover, and punish serious
crimes.”).
174. These critics typically focus on public welfare legislation that does not require
a showing of direct personal involvement to convict a manager of company violations.
Courts also have upheld these statutes, holding that they do not require a finding of
intent or negligence to support convictions. See Margaret Graham Tebo, Guilty by Reason of
Title, 86 A.B.A. J. 44, 45 (May 2000).
175. See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (where the corporate man-
ager was punished because he as in a position to prevent or correct the offense, had a
responsibility to do so, and failed to comply).
176. In the case of British bank Lloyds TSB Group, several employees manipulated
the bank’s central system orders by hiding identifying information of transactions
originating in Iran.  None of the employees were charged with a crime under the Justice
Department’s deferred prosecution agreement. See Bajaj & Eligon, supra note 20.
177. When ING Bank moved more than a billion dollars through banks to Cuba,
Iran, and other countries from the early 1990s to 2007, they did so partly by evading
computer filters designed to prevent sanctioned entities from gaining access to the U.S.
banking system. See Karen Freifeld, ING to pay $619 million of Cuba, Iran sanctions, REUTERS,
Jun. 12, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/12/us-ing-sanctions-
idUSBRE85B12I20120612.
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increased accountability as a result of agreements’ close monitoring179,
or even a desire to avoid collateral consequences of criminal prosecu-
tion.  Though these goals are understandable, the overreaching conse-
quences shed light on the hazards of relying on deferred prosecution
agreements.  Collateral consequences are a non-sequitur to prosecuting
individuals.  Sanctions that are perpetrated by individuals are weighed
against the collateral consequence of shutting down their business or
individually prosecuting them, and that rationale should extend to the
corporate context.180  These agreements are imperfect tools for affect-
ing widespread corporate change or compliance with sanctions, failing
to instill a sense of responsibility in both the corporation and individ-
ual.  Most importantly, there is no evidence that the Department of Jus-
tice or any other governmental entity has monitored financial
institutions’ compliance, and if they have, to what extent the monitor-
ing has permeated the institution.
Deterrence is left by the wayside as banks conclude that the civil
fines imposed as a result of their discretion are grossly underwhelming
compared to both the total valued transactions and the profits they
reap from making the transactions.  The general deterrence principle
seeks to punish the offender in order to convince the general commu-
nity to forego criminal conduct in the future.181  Specific deterrence
seeks to deter a defendant’s future conduct.  According to this princi-
ple, an increase in the likelihood of punishment will deter more effec-
tively than an increase in severity.  In the case of HSBC, the bank may
be specifically deterred from committing future crimes—even though
the bank avoided criminal charges, if the bank ran afoul of federal
rules, the Justice Department has the right to resume a case against
them and file criminal charges.182  One can imagine that institutions
breathed a sigh of relief after finding out that their charges would be
limited to civil penalties and fines—the deferred prosecution agree-
ment essentially serves as a warning to avoid disobeying any more laws.
However, such fines are a cost of doing business.  It is further
unlikely that other banks will be deterred from committing the same
crimes.  Because the caught banks only paid one half a quarter’s
profit183 in its fines and avoided a criminal indictment or guilty plea,
179. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Speech to the
New York City Bar Ass’n (Sept. 13, 2012).
180. See United States v. Bassidji, 413 F.3d 928, 934–35 (9th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Hescorp, 801 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1986).
181. Jeremy S. Parker, Criminal Sentencing for Organizations: The Unifying Approach of
Optimal Penalties, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 513, 554 (1989).
182. Protess & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 37, at A4.
183. See, e.g., Standard Chartered pays $327m to settle Iran fine, DAILY TELEGRAPH (UK)
(Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9735083/
Standard-Chartered-pays-327m-to-settle-Iran-fine.html (discussing the $250 billion worth of
transactions that Standard Chartered hid with Iran, compared to the $327 million of fines
it paid to settle the allegations, which is only 1.3% of the total transactions).  In 2011,
Standard Chartered set a ninth consecutive year of record net profit, reaching $4.7 bil-
lion. See Fiona Law & Max Colchester, Standard Chartered Profit Reaches Record $4.75 Billion,
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the banks have essentially been able to continue daily operations.184
The message that is being conveyed by the government, therefore,
reads more like a stealth encouragement to other financial institutions
to engage in continuous disregard for sanctions.185  As noted, the only
corporations that have been criminally indicted or pled guilty to violat-
ing sanctions in the past have been non-financial institutions.  Here, the
government offers banks reverse incentives—the bigger the institution
and the more financial services it provides, the less it will be fined and
the less likely it will be criminally prosecuted.  A lack of a stringent mon-
itoring program does not actually rehabilitate banks as much as it casts
a superficial solution to correct banks’ future behavior.  Indeed, institu-
tions and individuals who think that prosecutors will have a natural
inclination towards deferred prosecution will be dissuaded from follow-
ing proper protocol and obeying sanctions.
It is questionable whether banks will be rehabilitated because of
the Department of Justice’s recommendations.  The principle of reha-
bilitation is tied closely to deterrence, but instead of securing compli-
ance through fear of punishment, rehabilitation is used to reform the
wrongdoer.  Under this theory, correctional systems in place are inade-
quately informing the wrongdoer of its purported crimes.  Though the
deferred prosecution agreements have included proposed changes to
banks’ reporting system and implementation of a mandatory reporting
system, banks are not subject to the kind of reflection and reformation
that accompanies rehabilitation.  The government-imposed changes on
banks mostly encourage strengthening internal compliance controls
and commitment to obey federal laws for a few years.186  For Standard
Chartered, its agreement suggested that the bank “enhance and opti-
mize” voluntary compliance programs by increasing personnel and
resources devoted to sanctions compliance, enhance its global sanction
compliance policies and procedures, and design and implement
improved sanctions compliance training for the staff.187  On its face,
these programs sound stringent and encompassing, but nowhere does
the agreement suggest that OFAC, the Department of Justice, or any
other governmental agency would monitor the implementation and
progress of the programs to ensure full compliance.  In short, these
changes do not expose institutional leaders to the dire repercussions of
their violations, including potentially funneling money to Iranian ter-
184. Protess & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 37, at A4.
185. University of Notre Dame law professor and former Undersecretary for
Enforcement for the U.S. Treasury Department Jimmy Gurulé has characterized the gov-
ernment’s actions as suggesting, “[I]f you want to engage in money laundering, make
sure you’re doing it within the context of your employment at the bank. . . .  Do it on a
very large scale, and you won’t get prosecuted.” See Mark Gongloff, Obama Administration
Essentially Admits That Some Banks Are Too Big to Jail, Which Is Troubling, HUFFINGTON POST
(Dec. 12, 2012, 5:04 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/11/hsbc-too-big-to-
jail_n_2279439.html.
186. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 153, at Attachment A 7-15; see
also Protess & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 37, at A4.
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rorist groups and arming Iran with resources to purchase or develop
weapons of mass destruction.188
The principle of retributivism, a backwards-looking principle that
justifies punishment because of the voluntary commission of the crime,
is arguably unfulfilled because banks and individuals who made the
choice to willingly violate sanctions are not given punishments propor-
tionate to their crimes.  For one, the deferred prosecution agreements
for the banks that have violated sanctions have not included any sort of
shareholder compensation remedy.  In contrast, previous agreements
have given substantial payments consisting of cash in restitution, issu-
ance of stock, and cash payments to compensate shareholders in share-
holder class actions.189
The continued use of deferred prosecution in the corporate con-
text creates a dual system of justice.  When banks are treated with cau-
tious deference, prosecutors demean other corporations and
individuals, contributing to a notion that their societal status and con-
tribution are not as meaningful or important as financial institution’s
stature.  The message to the public is simple: If you are an individual or
small business owner, you will be prosecuted for violating Iranian sanc-
tions, no matter the size or quantity of your transaction.  However, if
you are a bank official of a large, international bank, you will be
granted prosecutorial leeway and avoid criminal sanctions altogether.
This criminal justice system, therefore, fails to serve the interests of the
public by arbitrarily treating a class of individuals differently than
another class.
V. REMEDIES AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Practical and effective recommendations can be gradually imple-
mented in order to improve corporate prosecutions and encourage cor-
porate compliance.  Given the scant evidence cited, consequences do
not explain why the Department of Justice has failed to prosecute bank
officials.  Solutions must work towards deterring and punishing banks
from repeatedly violating sanctions. The solutions range from building
internal corporate structures with regular government oversight to
curbing the use of deferred prosecutions and abandoning the use of
deferred prosecutions in the corporate context altogether.  In the end,
however, these structural implementations must fulfill the goals of pun-
ishment.  Otherwise, any consequences that banks face will be left by
the wayside.
188. In fact, HSBC’s Mexican operation transferred more than $7 billion to the
United States, which officials deemed to have had to be “illegal drug proceeds.”  Further-
more, HSBC worked with Saudi Al Rajhi bank, which has supported Al Qaeda.  Protess &
Silver-Greenberg, supra note 37.
189. See Leonard Orland, The Transformation of Corporate Criminal Law, 1 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN.  COM. L. 64 (2006) (noting that Computer Associates, a corporation that faced
an indictment for securities fraud and obstruction of justice in 2004, entered into a
deferred prosecution agreement that included $225 million in restitution and cash pay-
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If deferred prosecution is to be used at all, corporations should be
forced to establish an enhanced compliance system.  Here, the corpora-
tions would implement a cross-departmental monitoring system that
uses an independent agency hired by the government to conduct regu-
lar checks on corporations.190  This entity would operate on dual-pro-
cess basis.  First, the entity could make recommendations to help the
corporation in complying with the agreement, initiate changes within
the corporation, and observe the corporation during the time of the
deferred prosecution.  While the Justice Department issued a memo-
randum in the past to address the selection of a qualified monitor, the
Morford Memo does not address the problems of implementing the
monitorship.191  The monitor must evaluate, propose, and help estab-
lish internal controls for the corporation, but the specifics of when and
how the monitoring is to take place is left to the discretion of the corpo-
ration.  Second, the monitor could make additional follow-ups during
the agreement’s duration to ensure continued compliance.  The entity
would continue to make recommendations.  In reality, although banks’
recent deferred prosecution agreements include implementing new
sanctions compliance procedures and policies, nowhere do they indi-
cate whether these programs will be monitored, thus defying the pur-
pose of making sure banks comply with the agreement’s terms.192  As a
result, the government seemingly leaves the banks alone after the agree-
ment is signed, only stepping in after any more federal laws are violated
but failing to prevent such violations before they happen.
Furthermore, in using deferred prosecution agreements, the gov-
ernment could be more hesitant in employing them when U.S. sanc-
tions are ignored, following a set of strict and clear standards set by the
Department of Justice.  Instead of broad-based use of these agreements,
they should be limited to negligent violations or used in their original
capacities.  For example, the Department of Justice could amend their
policy manual and recommend specific standards for pursuing deferred
prosecution agreement.193  If the agreements are used at all in the cor-
porate context, unlike the standards set forth in the Holder and
Thompson memoranda, new standards would present straightforward
190. The independent status of the monitor is crucial, a monitor that is hired by
the corporation could create a conflict of interest.  The U.S. government could fashion a
monitoring team much like the Analytical Sanctions and Monitoring Team of the U.N.
Security Council.  This team submits comprehensive reports to the Sanctions Committees
as well as enhances the effectiveness of the anti-terrorism economic sanctions measures.
See Gurulé, supra note 45, at 32–33.
191. Memorandum from Craig Morford, Acting Dep. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Jus.,
to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Atty’s, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (2008), http://www
.usdoj.gov/dag/morford-useofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf [hereinafter Morford
Memorandum].
192. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Standard Chartered Bank,
No. 1:12-cr-00262 (D.D.C. Dec. 10, 2012).
193. For a general discussion of how the Department of Justice can amend their
policy manuals in other white collar crime cases, such as money laundering cases, see
Leslie A. Dickinson, Note, Revisiting the “Merger Problem” in Money Laundering Prosecutions
Post-Santos and the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
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situations in which agreements should and should not be used.194
When situations trigger proper use of agreements, prosecutors could
also limit them to situations “where they certainly would have indicted
otherwise for all the right reasons on their part.”195
Then, the policy reasons behind using deferred prosecution agree-
ments could be used with little room for abuse: Whatever collateral con-
sequences that proponents attach to these agreements would have to be
empirically proven.  For example, the defendant corporation might
have the burden of proof in showing why a criminal prosecution would
cause their business to fail.  They would have to show a direct and
causal relationship between a criminal indictment and irrevocable
losses of their company.196  In addition, if individuals seek clemency
from criminal indictment, either they or the corporation would have to
prove how much prosecuting a bank official would affect future corpo-
rate earnings, corporate stability, and daily operations.  The lack of an
agreement’s popularity and usage would somewhat lessen any reliance
that corporations have when they willingly violate laws, thereby encour-
aging them to engage in across-the-board corporate compliance.
Finally, as a more dramatic measure, deferred prosecution agree-
ments could be banned completely.  To the extent that the agreements
were originally intended to apply to non-serious offenders, use of
deferred prosecution could be reverted back to those limits.  Refusing
to give corporate individuals and institutions any sort of leniency would
send a strong message to those contemplating violations.  In this
instance, sanctioned countries would have to pass extremely difficult
barriers in order to funnel money through U.S.-based banks.  Banks
who violate the sanctions, even once, would be charged criminally, and
institutional figures would similarly be jailed for such indiscretions.
There is a worry that shareholders will be penalized for activity over
which they had no control, yet any sanctions “imposed in excess of the
criminal profits obtained are spread among so many shareholders as to
be negligible.”197  By refusing to apply deferred agreements in the cor-
porate context, corporations will have strong incentives to promote due
diligence and carefully obey sanctions.
CONCLUSION
“Over the last decade, DPAs have become a mainstay of white col-
lar criminal law enforcement.”198  Such prolonged use of deferred
prosecution agreements creates a dual system of justice that suggests
194. For instance, where a corporation has continuously and willfully ignored sanc-
tions for more than a set number of years, the memorandum should highly discourage
use of deferred prosecution.  In addition, where the amount of transactions surpasses a
price ceiling, corporations could be fined more money and punished more severely.
195. Interview with Mary Jo White, supra note 105.
196. To meet a high standard, corporations could submit empirical data that
clearly delineates the probability of future loss of profits from imposing criminal charges.
197. Julie Rose O’Sullivan, Professional Discipline for Law Firms? A Response to Professor
Schneyer’s Proposal, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 35 (2002).
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that banks are above the law, especially when banks knowingly and
repeatedly violate economic sanctions meant to protect American citi-
zens from being harmed by terrorist individuals and organizations,
especially in the situation in which a nation with explicit terrorist ties
and animosity towards the United States is being assisted by banks in
the United States.  The interest in protecting the public cannot be met
when banks with offices in the United States transfer funds to sanc-
tioned countries with known terrorist organizations.199  Prosecutors
surrender to banks’ cries that a criminal indictment would expose them
to “catastrophic reputational damage,”200 choosing to levy them with
mere fines.  Compared to prison time and heavy penalties that are usu-
ally used to discipline individuals, banks escape blame for all of their
transgressions, though their exploitative behavior is no more different
than tax fraud perpetrated by individuals.
Former U.S. Attorney and current Securities Exchange Commis-
sion Chair Mary Jo White once expressed concern that deferred prose-
cutions, the “automatic alternative” to indictment, were “becoming a
deferred prosecution much too often.”201  White’s wishes were futile,
considering the trajectory of the Standard Chartered and other recent
banks’ scandals.  In turn, a dangerous cycle of complacency and ineq-
uity begins.  The sovereign, whose laws the corporations have violated,
is rendered irrelevant.  Most importantly, the system of justice upon
which our ideals are founded is chipped away with every deferred prose-
cution granted, as corporate managers, whose choices resonate through
the international sphere, hide behind the veil of their corporations and
immunize themselves from criminal liability.  A system of justice that is
continuously undermined and desecrated becomes nothing but a shal-
low skeleton teetering in the wind, flailing against the tide of corrup-
tion.  Such a system may not survive.  Courts must be vigilant in
stemming the rise of such tides.  Those who have the power to punish
should use their tools wisely and appropriately, holding liable a person
or and institution that is responsible for the harm that has been caused.
199. In a recent case against HSBC, the government charged HSBC with violations
of the Bank Secrecy Act and willfully facilitating financial transactions on behalf of sanc-
tioned entities in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(“IEEPA”). See United States v. HSBC Bank, No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *1 (Jul.
1, 2013).  The parties entered into a DPA, where the government agreed to dismiss the
charges if HSBC complies with terms, including addressing the lack of accountability over
their sanctions compliance programs. Id. at *2.  The Court, in reviewing the DPA,
approved it, saying it “retain[ed] the authority to ensure that the implementation of the
DPA remains within the bounds of lawfulness and respects the integrity of this Court.” Id.
at 11.
200. Farrell & Kary, supra note 7.





      05/20/2014   11:05:20
